Touro Law Review
Volume 18
Number 2 New York State Constitutional
Decisions: 2001 Compilation

Article 8

March 2016

People v. Johnson
Donna A. Napolitano

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Napolitano, Donna A. (2016) "People v. Johnson," Touro Law Review: Vol. 18: No. 2, Article 8.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol18/iss2/8

This Due Process is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. For
more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu.

Napolitano: Due Process

SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK

BRONX COUNTY
People v. Johnson'
(decided September 17, 2001)

Daniel Johnson was convicted of manslaughter in the
second degree for stabbing Joseph Bauer to death. 2 He was
sentenced to an indefinite term of imprisonment of five to fifteen

years.3 Johnson sought to vacate the judgment of conviction
alleging that the prosecution denied him due process in violation
of the Federal4 and New York State5 Constitutions by failing to6
turn over eyewitness statements that were exculpatory in nature. 7
Pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law ("C.P.L.") § 440. 10(1),
Johnson filed a motion to vacate his conviction. His motion was
granted. 8
' No. 98-8428, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 651 (Sup. Ct:. Bronx County Sept.
17, 2001).
2 Id. at *2.
3id.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides in pertinent part: "[Nior shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law...
5 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 provides in pertinent part: "No person shall be

deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
6 Johnson, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS at *2.
7 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10 (McKinney 2001) provides in pertinent
part:
At any time after the entry of a judgment, the court in which
it was entered may, upon motion of the defendant, vacate
such judgment upon the ground that: (g) [nIew evidence has
been discovered since the entry of a judgment based upon a
verdict of guilty after trial, which could not have been
produced by the defendant at the trial even with due diligence
on his part and which is of such character as to create a
probability that had such evidence been received at the trial
the verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant.
8 Johnson, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS, at *2.
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The eyewitness, Raffington Harrison, was arrested for his
involvement in the homicide, but was not formally charged with a
crime. 9 He remained in the state's control and agreed to testify
against Johnson and his co-defendant, Karl Love. 10
The
defendants were subsequently tried separately; Love's trial
occurred three months after Johnson was convicted." At the
Love trial, Harrison testified regarding statements he made in
August 1998.12 His statements were on videotape and in the
prosecution's possession from the time they were given. 13 The
videotape was provided to Love and offered into evidence and as
a result he was acquitted of all charges. 14 However, while the
prosecution conceded that these statements were in the state's
possession at the time of Johnson's earlier trial, they were not
provided to the defendant for use at his trial. 15
Johnson's motion to vacate the judgment of conviction17
was based upon a Rosario violation.' 6 In People v. Rosario,
Luis Rosario was convicted of murder in the first degree when,
18
during a robbery, he shot and killed a restaurant proprietor.
The New York Court of Appeals upheld Rosario's conviction in
an appeal alleging reversible error by the trial judge when he
refused to permit defense counsel's review of prior statements
made by prosecutorial witnesses prior to trial.19 The statements
in question were submitted to the trial judge who subsequently
determined that the inconsistencies between the prior statements
and the witnesses' in-court testimony necessitated defense
9Id.
10

Id.
11Id.
12 Id. at *2-3.
13Johnson, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS at *3.
"4

Id. at *3.

15Id.

Id. As articulated in People v. Rosario, any statement made by a
government witness must be made available to the defense for purposes of
cross-examination and impeachment. 9 N.Y.2d 286, 173 N.E.2d 881, 213
N.Y.S.2d 448 (1961).
17 9 N.Y.2d at 286, 173 N.E.2d at 881, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 448.
8 Id. at 287-88, 173 N.E.2d at 882, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 449.
'9 Id. at 288, 173 N.E.2d at 882, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 449.
16
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counsel's review of only the inconsistent portions of the
statement.2 ° As a result of Rosario's appeal, the Court of
Appeals held that the trial judge should have turned over the
statements in their entirety in accordance with the United States
Supreme Court holding in Jencks v. United States.21 In Jencks,

the Court held that "a defendant is entitled to inspect any
statement made by the Government's witness which bears on the
subject matter of the witness' testimony." 22 The court's holding
23
ultimately gave rise to a statute known as "The Jencks Act."
Clearly, the Rosario ruling was a divergence from prior law, but
the court opined,
[t]he procedure to be followed turns largely on
policy considerations, and upon further study and
reflection this court is persuaded that a right sense
of justice entitles the defense to examine a witness'
prior statement, whether or not it varies from his
testimony on the stand. As long as the statement
relates to the subject matter of the witness'
testimony and contains nothing that must be kept
confidential, defense counsel should be allowed to
determine for themselves the use to be made of it
on cross-examination. 2 a
The holding in Rosario was not predicated on any
provision in the New York State or Federal Constitution.25 The
20

id.

353 U.S. 657 (1957).
Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d at 289, 173 N.E.2d at 883, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 450
(citing Jencks, 353 U.S. at 667-68).
23 Unites States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, n.2 (1985) (citing The Jencks Act,
18 U.S.C. § 3500, which "requires the prosecutor to disclose, after direct
examination of a Government witness and on the defendant's motion, any
statement of the witness in the Government's possession that relates to the
subject matter of the witness' testimony.").
24 Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d at 289, 173 N.Y.2d at 883, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 450.
25 People v. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d 638, 644, 585 N.E.2d 795, 799, 578
21

22

N.Y.S.2d 483, 487 (1991). Defendant was convicted of six counts of felony
murder and one count of second-degree arson. Defendant filed a motion to
vacate his conviction based upon the People's failure to provide him with a
statement made by a prosecutorial witness. The trial judge granted the
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Court of Appeals has explained that the Rosario rule "in essence,
[articulates] a discovery rule, based on a deeply held belief that
simple fairness requires the defendant to be supplied with

prosecution reports and statements that could conceivably aid in
26
the defense's cross-examination of prosecution witnesses."
Fundamentally, the rule stands for the proposition that the
defense should not be deprived of the right to inspect a witness'

statement for use on cross-examination.2 7 The very basis of the
rule is to allow the defendant a reasonable opportunity to assess
the witness' credibility.28 This rule was later codified by the

Legislature and became New York Criminal Procedure Law
§ 240.45.29

defendant's motion and the appellate division affirmed. The People filed a
motion for leave to appeal and subsequently the Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded to determine if there was a reasonable possibility that the Rosario
material in question was a factor in the verdict.
26
27

See, e.g., Id.

People v. Perez, 65 N.Y.2d 154, 158, 489 N.E.2d 361, 363, 490

N.Y.S.2d 747, 749 (1985). The defendant and a co-defendant were found
guilty of felony murder and manslaughter. A witness, the sister of defendant's
wife, was offered money to leave the area and not testify. This witness
advised the district attorney who recorded the conversations between the
witness and her sister and the sister's son. Defense counsel notified the court
that this witness sought to solicit a bribe, but the prosecution did not
acknowledge the situation. On cross-examination, the witness testified as to
the prosecution's knowledge which prompted an appeal by the defendant based
upon a Rosario violation. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial.
21 Id. at 159, 489 N.E.2d at 364, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
29 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.45 (McKinney 2001).
After the jury has been sworn and before the prosecutor's
opening address, or in the case of a single judge trial after
commencement and before submission of evidence, the
prosecutor shall, subject to a protective order, make available
to the defendant: (a) [a]ny written or recorded statement,
including any testimony before a grand jury and an
examination videotaped pursuant to section 190.32 of this
chapter, made by a person whom the prosecutor intends to
call as a witness at trial, and which relates to the subject
matter of the witness's testimony.
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However, subsequent cases both enhanced and further
developed the Rosario rule and refined the "per se" error rule.
The "per se" error rule requires reversal whenever there is a
complete failure by the prosecution in turning over Rosario
material. 30 In People v. Consolazio,3' decided fifteen years after
Rosario, the New York Court of Appeals held the "per se" error
rule is applicable when a motion is made on direct appeal from a
judgment of conviction. 32 The court reaffirmed the Consolazio
holding in People v. Perez,33 People v. Ranghelle,34 and People
v. Jones.35 Moreover, the Jones majority stated,
[i]t is defense counsel alone who has the
responsibility for making the strategic judgments
and doing the careful preparation required for
planning and executing an effective crossexamination of the People's witnesses and deciding
whether and how to use the statements. When, as
a result of the prosecutor's violation of tfhe Rosario
rule, defense counsel has been deprived of material
of which he or she is unaware or cannot otherwise
obtain, there is no way, short of speculation, of
determining how it might have been used or how
its denial to 36counsel might have damaged
defendant's case.
In Jones, the court held, "the prosecution's violation of the rule
is ...

a complete failure to deliver the items ...

constitut[ing]

per se error requiring reversal, and good faith or inadvertence on
the part of the prosecutor is of no moment. 07
30

Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 640, 585 N.E.2d 795 at 796, 578 N.Y.S. at 484.

"' 40 N.Y.2d 446, 354 N.E.2d 801, 387 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1976). (finding that

the Rosario materials in question were duplicate equivalents of material already
in the possession of the defendant and thus did not represent a Rosario
violation).
32 Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 641, 585 N.E.2d at 797, 578 N.Y.S.2d
at 485

(citing Consolazio, 40 N.Y.2d at 454).
33

34

65 N.Y.2d at 154, 480 N.E.2d at 361, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 747.

69 N.Y.2d 56, 503 N.E.2d 1011, 511 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1986).

3' 70

N.Y.2d 547, 517 N.E.2d 865, 523 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1987).
Id. at 552, 517 N.E.2d at 868, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 56 (emphasis in original).
37 Id. at 553, 517 N.E.2d at 869, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 57.
36
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A defendant may file a motion pursuant to CPL § 440.10
only after exhausting all available direct appeals. 38 Despite prior
decisions by the New York Court of Appeals and the stringent
discovery requirements placed upon a Rosario claim, the
Legislature requires that to prevail on a CPL § 440.10 motion,
the defendant must show that he was actually prejudiced.39
Notably, CPL § 440.10 does not apply specifically to a Rosario
claim, but refers to "newly discovered evidence" (CPL
§ 440. 10(1)(g)) and "improper and prejudicial conduct" (CPL
§ 440. 10(1)(D). 40 The Jackson court believed that any Rosario
claim would naturally fall under § 440.10 (1)(f) by its very nature
of being improper and prejudicial .4 The court cited language in
the Rosario decision that specifically obligates the prosecution to
"turn over pretrial statements of prosecution witnesses'
testimony,,42 and failure to comply denotes a violation of "both
statutory and common-law mandates," 43 thus making it both
improper and prejudicial.
By applying the "per se" reversal rule, the Johnson court
was required to adhere to one of the three exceptions set forth by
the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Banch.4 First,
"after exhaustion of a defendant's direct appeal, a new trial is
required only if the defendant can demonstrate 'a reasonable
possibility that the failure to disclose the Rosario material
38

Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d at 641, 585 N.E.2d at 797, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 485.

39
40

Id; see supra note 7.
Id. at 645, 585 N.E.2d at 799, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 487; see supra note 7.

41

Id.

Id. at 646, 585 N.E.2d at 800, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 488.
43 Id.
44 People v. Banch, 80 N.Y.2d 610, 616, 608 N.E.2d 1069, 1072, 593
N.Y.S.2d 491, 494 (1992).
Defendant was convicted of first degree
manslaughter, attempted second degree murder and other related charges.
Defendant made several inculpatory statements at the scene of the crime, in the
hospital, and at the police station the next day. A police memo book, two
affidavits used to obtain a search warrant, and a report prepared by a former
district attorney were deemed Rosario material, but defense's motion for a new
suppression hearing and/or a mistrial were denied. After conviction and
affirmation by the appellate court, the Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded for a new trial.
42
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contributed to the verdict.' ,, 45 Second, "Rosario material cannot
be produced because it has been lost or destroyed." 46 Under this

exception, the court, having judged the degree of prosecutorial
fault and ensuing prejudice to the defendant, can impose a
sanction - "preclusion of the witness' testimony or an adverse
inference charge." 47 The third exception is applied when the
material withheld "is not the duplicative equivalent of material
that was disclosed." 48 In Banch, the New York Court of Appeals
concluded that "[t]he simple principle that underlies Rosario is
that the ends of criminal
justice are best served by full disclosure
49
of the relevant facts."

In Clark v. Greiner,50 the defendant raised a Rosario
claim when he alleged that the prosecution failed to provide a
videotape of the victim's autopsy. 5 1 Specifically, he alleged that
he was deprived of his Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial

as a result of the prosecution's failure to produce the videotape .52
The court stated,
[w]hile the Rosario rule has a federal counterpart,
see Jencks v. United States, neither the Rosario nor
45

id.

4 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 616-17, 608 N.E.2d at 1073, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 495 (emphasis
added.)
49 Id. at 621, 608 N.E.2d at 1075-76, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 497-98.
50 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1317 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2001).
Defendant,
Samuel Clark, his brother and 14-year old Rene Perez shot and killed a livery
driver. Clark was convicted of murder in the second degree and sentenced to
23 years to life and given a concurrent sentence of 5 to 15 years for criminal
possession of a weapon in the second degree. Clark appealed his conviction.
While the direct appeal was pending, he filed a § 440.10 motion to vacate
judgment claiming the failure to received the autopsy audiotape was a Rosario
violation. The motion was denied and the appellate division unanimously
affirmed the judgment of conviction. The Court of Appeals denied defendant's
application for leave to appeal and a writ of habeas corpus was filed. The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied the
writ, "because Clark has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right." Id at *17.
" Id. at *14.
52 id.
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the Jencks rule is compelled by the United States
Constitution. Of course, the failure to fulfill a
disclosure obligation 'can implicate constitutional
rights if it violates the due process mandates of
Brady v. Maryland and its progeny'.
,53

In Brady v. Maryland,54 the Supreme Court upheld the
decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals that suppression of
evidence by the prosecution was "a violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 55 The Supreme Court
cited the rule articulated in Mooney v. Holohan:56
It is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be
satisfied by mere notice and hearing if a State has
contrived a conviction through the pretense of a
trial which in truth is but used as a means of
depriving a defendant of liberty through a
deliberate deception of court and jury by the
presentation of testimony known to be perjured.
Such a contrivance by a State to procure the
conviction and imprisonment of a defendant is as
inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of
justice as is the obtaining of a like result by
intimidation." 7

53 Id at *15 (citations omitted).
14

373 U.S. 83 (1963). Defendant Brady and a companion, Boblit, were

sentenced to death after being found guilty of murder in the first degree.
Boblit, in extrajudicial statements, admitted he was the one who committed the
actual homicide. These statements were withheld by the prosecution until after
Brady received the death sentence. The trial court denied Brady's motion for a
new trial based on this newly discovered evidence, as well as, post-conviction
relief under the Maryland Post Conviction Procedure Act. On appeal, the
Maryland Court of Appeals remanded for a new trial on the issue of
punishment alone holding that the suppression of Boblit's statement was a due
process violation.
"

Id. at 86.

294 U.S. 103 (1935).
"' Brady, 373 U.S. at 86 (citing Mooney 294 U.S. at 112).
56
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The Court later expanded the holding in Mooney in Pyle
v. Kansas58 and held "allegations ... from the deliberate
suppression... of favorable evidence.., charge a deprivation
of rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution." 59 Moreover,
the Court held that even in spite of good faith by the prosecution,
evidence that is material to guilt or punishment is a violation of
the accused's due process . 60 This underscores the principle that
"the administration of justice suffers when the accused is treated
unfairly. "61 The Court further opined:
A prosecution that withholds evidence on demand
of an accused which, if made available, would tend
to exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps shape
a trial that bears heavily on the defendant. That
casts the prosecutor in the role of architect of a
proceeding that does not comport with standards of
justice .... 62
Brady guarantees that the due process requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment are satisfied at all times. Every state in
the Union has an obligation to "guard and enforce every right
secured by [the] Constitution. "63 In particular, Article I, § 6 of
New York State's Constitution emulates the precepts of the
Fourteenth Amendment. "The clauses are formulated in the
same words and are intended for the protection of the same
fundamental rights of the individual and there is, logically, no
room for distinction in definition of the scope of the two
65
clauses. "

317 U.S. 213 (1942).
'9 Brady, 373 U.S. at 86 (citing Pyle, 317 U.S. at 215-16).
60 Id. at 87.
58

61 Id.

Id. at 87-88.
Mooney, 294 U.S. at 113.
64 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6, states in pertinent part, "No person shall be
62
63

deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
65 Central Savings Bank v. New York, 289 N.Y. 9, 10, 19 N.E.2d 659,
cert.
denied, 306 U.S. 661 (1939).
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Accordingly, the enforcement of these fundamental rights
is the principal purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment.66 "That
requirement, in safeguarding the liberty of the citizen against
deprivation through the action of the State, embodies the
fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our
civil and political institutions." 67 It has been held that when a
prosecutor violates a defendant's constitutional rights, and his
actions result in an unfairly won conviction, such conviction is
the fundamental denial of due process. 68 In cases considering
both the Fourteenth Amendment and the New York State
Constitution, it was "held that due process of law is 'law in its
regular course of administration through courts of justice. "69 As
a result, it was determined that no man, through that process of
law, can be "deprived of his liberty .... ,,70
Assuredly, the withholding of exculpatory evidence rises
to the level of deprivation of due process and violates the very
precepts of the Fourteenth Amendment and § 6 of the New York
State Constitution. The purpose of the Brady rule is not to
supplant the adversary system in uncovering the truth, but rather
a means to ensure justice. 7' The same can be said for the Rosario
doctrine.
Thus, the prosecutor is required to disclose any
favorable evidence or any evidence that will have a significant
impact on the defendant's right to a fair trial. 72 This rule applies
to exculpatory as well as impeachment evidence. 7'
The United States Supreme Court in United States v.
74
Agurs first articulated the standard of materiality in determining
a potential Brady violation. In Bagley the Court explained how
66Mooney, 294 U.S. at 113.
61 Id. at 112.
68

Hammer v. Saffle, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 3583, *17, cert. denied, 510

U.S. 952 (1993).
69

People ex rel. Hammer v. Leubischer, 34 A.D. 577, 584-85 (1898)

(citations omitted).
70 Id. at 585.
71 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985).
72

Id. at 675-76.

73 Id. at 676.
74 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
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Agurs had established three circumstances where post-trial
discovery of favorable evidence might be known to the
prosecution but withheld. 75 First, the prosecution's use of known
perjured or false testimony ;76 second, where there was no request
by the defendant for Brady material and favorable evidence was
withheld; 77 and finally, where a request was made by the
defendant and such evidence was not disclosed.78 In the latter
instance, failure by the prosecution "to make any response is
seldom, if ever, excusable." 79 The Bagley Court then analyzed
how Strickland
v. Washington had further expanded the
80
standard:
We find the Strickland formulation of the Agurs
test for materiality sufficiently flexible to cover the
"no request," "general request," and "specific
request" cases of prosecutorial failure to disclose
evidence favorable to the accused: The evidence is
material only if there is a reasonable probability
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. A "reasonable probability" is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome. 8
A defense counsel's pretrial agreements and trial decisions
are significantly impacted as a result of requested evidence that is
withheld by the prosecution.8 2 This prosecutorial blunder
erroneously results in the presumption that the evidence does not
83
exist.
In summary, the Rosario rule and the doctrine articulated
in Brady v. Maryland and its progeny offer defendants state
75

Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678.

Id. at 680.
Id. (emphasis added).
78
Id. at 681.

76
77

79 Id.

'0
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
81
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
82 Id. at 682-83.
83 id.
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constitutional, state statutory, and Federal Constitutional
guarantees mandating justice in their trial. Rosario entitles the
defendant to have access to statements made by prosecution
witnesses prior to any cross-examination conducted at trial. s4
New York courts have expanded the original holding in Rosario
to cover statements made at suppression hearings, notes of a
police officer made at the time of the defendant's arrest,
prosecutor's worksheets and taped statements of prosecution
witnesses made to a private party. 5 New York's CPL codifies
the Rosario holding and provides a statutory avenue for
defendants to file motions to vacate their convictions whenever
the prosecution withholds evidence which will ultimately benefit
them. While neither the judicial holdings or the statute create an
absolute right to review a prosecutor's file, it does obligate the
prosecutor to act in good faith.86 As the Ranghelle court wrote,
"the State has no interest in interposing any obstacle to the
disclosure of the facts, and society's interest in maintaining
criminal trials as truth finding processes requires that the burden
of locating and producing prior statements of complaining
filed with police agencies, remain solely with the
witnesses,
"8 7
People.
Moreover, the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 1 § 6
of the New York State Constitution require that "no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law." 88 These provisions are clearly established in the Brady
doctrine and in New York's criminal procedure law. Both
mandate a new trial whenever a suppression of material evidence
is found, thereby ensuring due process guarantees. As the Brady
its point whenever
court asserted, "[t]he United States wins
89
justice is done its citizens in the courts."
Donna A. Napolitano
'4 Ranghelle, 69

85 Id.
86

N.Y.2d at 56, 503 N.E.2d at 1011, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 580.

Id.at 63, 64.

87

id.

88

N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.

89 Brady, 373

U.S. at 87.
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